LeX-Ray

CRIMIED of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity ( 3 ) , has made a very important contribution towards the creation of the internal market for electricity. The guarantee of a high level of security of electricity supply is a key objective for the successful operation of the internal market and that Directive gives the Member States the possibility of imposing public service obligations on electricity undertakings, inter alia , in relation to security of supply. Those public service obligations should be defined as precisely and strictly as possible, and should not result in the creation of generation capacity that goes beyond what is necessary to prevent undue interruption of distribution of electricity to final customers.

Demand for electricity is usually forecast over a medium-term period on the basis of scenarios elaborated by transmission system operators or by other organisations capable of constructing them at the request of a Member State.

A competitive single EU electricity market necessitates transparent and non-discriminatory policies on security of electricity supply compatible with the requirements of such a market. The absence of such policies in individual Member States, or significant differences between the policies of the Member States would lead to distortions of competition. The definition of clear roles and responsibilities of the competent authorities, as well as of Member States themselves and all relevant market actors, is therefore crucial in safeguarding security of electricity supply and the proper functioning of the internal market while at the same time avoiding creating obstacles to market entrants, such as companies generating or supplying electricity in a Member State that have recently started their operations in that Member State, and avoiding creating distortions of the internal market for electricity or significant difficulties for market actors, including companies with small market shares, such as generators or suppliers with a very small share in the relevant Community market.

Decision No 1229/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 4 ) , sets out a series of guidelines for Community policy on trans-European energy networks. Regulation 2003/1228 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity ( 5 ) sets out, inter alia , the general principles and detailed rules relating to congestion management.

When promoting electricity from renewable energy sources, it is necessary to ensure the availability of associated back-up capacity, where technically necessary, in order to maintain the reliability and security of the network.

In order to meet the Community’s environmental commitments and to reduce its dependence on imported energy, it is important to take account of the long-term effects of growth of electricity demand.

Cooperation between national transmission system operators in issues relating to network security including definition of transfer capacity, information provision and network modelling is vital to the development of a well-functioning internal market and could be further improved. A lack of coordination regarding network security is detrimental to the development of equal conditions for competition.

The main intention of the relevant technical rules and recommendations, such as those contained in the Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) Operation handbook, similar rules and recommendations developed by Nordel, the Baltic Grid Code and those for the United Kingdom and Irish systems, is to provide support for the technical operation of the interconnected network, thus contributing to meeting the need for continued operation of the network in the event of system failure at an individual point or points in the network and minimising the costs related to mitigating such supply disruption.

Transmission and distribution system operators should be required to deliver a high level of service to final customers in terms of the frequency and duration of interruptions.

Measures which may be used to ensure that appropriate levels of generation reserve capacity are maintained should be market-based and non-discriminatory and could include measures such as contractual guarantees and arrangements, capacity options or capacity obligations. These measures could also be supplemented by other non-discriminatory instruments such as capacity payments.

In order to ensure that appropriate prior information is available, Member States should publish measures taken to maintain the balance between supply and demand among actual and potential investors in generation and among electricity consumers.

Without prejudice to Articles 86, 87 and 88 of the Treaty, it is important for Member States to lay down an unambiguous, appropriate and stable framework which will facilitate security of electricity supply and is conducive to investments in generation capacity and demand management techniques. It is also important that appropriate measures are taken to ensure a regulatory framework that encourages investment in new transmission interconnection, especially between Member States.

The European Council in Barcelona on 15 and 16 March 2002 agreed on a level of interconnection between Member States. Low levels of interconnection have the effect of fragmenting the market and are an obstacle to the development of competition. The existence of adequate physical transmission interconnection capacity, whether cross-border or not, is crucial but it is not a sufficient condition for competition to be fully effective. In the interest of final customers, the relation between the potential benefits of new interconnection projects and the costs for such projects should be reasonably balanced.

While it is important to determine the maximum available transfer capacities without breaching the requirements of secure network operation, it is also important to ensure full transparency of the capacity calculation and allocation procedure in the transmission system. In this way, it could be possible to make better use of existing capacity, and no false shortage signals will be given to the market, which will support the achievement of a fully competitive internal market as envisaged in CRIMIED.

Transmission and distribution system operators need an appropriate and stable regulatory framework for investment, and for maintenance and renewal of the networks.

Article 4 of CRIMIED requires Member States to monitor and submit a report on security of electricity supply. This report should cover short, medium and long-term factors relevant for security of supply including transmission system operators’ intention to invest in the network. In compiling such a report, Member States will be expected to refer to information and assessments already being undertaken by transmission system operators both on an individual and collective basis, including at European level.

Member States should ensure the effective implementation of this Directive.

Since the objectives of the proposed action, namely secure electricity supplies based on fair competition and the creation of a fully operational internal electricity market, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale and effects of the action, be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives,