LeX-Ray

The global financial crisis that emerged in 2007-2008 has revealed excessive speculative activities, important regulatory gaps, ineffective supervision, opaque markets and overly complex products in the financial system. The Union has adopted a range of measures in order to render the banking system more solid and more stable, including strengthening capital requirements, rules on improved governance and supervision and resolution regimes, and to ensure that the financial system fulfils its role in directing capital towards the financing of the real economy. Progress made on the establishment of the banking union is also decisive in this context. However, the crisis has also highlighted the need to improve transparency and monitoring not only in the traditional banking sector but also in areas where bank-like credit intermediation known as ‘shadow banking’, takes place, the scale of which is alarming, having already been estimated to amount to close to half of the regulated banking system. Any shortcomings with regard to those activities, which are similar to those carried out by credit institutions, have the potential to affect the rest of the financial sector.

In the context of its work to curb shadow banking, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) established by Regulation 2010/1092 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 5 ) have identified the risks posed by securities financing transactions (SFTs). SFTs allow the build-up of leverage, pro-cyclicality and interconnectedness in the financial markets. In particular, a lack of transparency in the use of SFTs has prevented regulators and supervisors as well as investors from correctly assessing and monitoring the respective bank-like risks and level of interconnectedness in the financial system in the period preceding and during the financial crisis. Against this background, on 29 August 2013, the FSB adopted the policy framework entitled ‘Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking’ (‘FSB Policy Framework’) for addressing shadow banking risks in securities lending and repos, which was endorsed in September 2013 by the G20 Leaders.

On 14 October 2014, the FSB published a regulatory framework for haircuts on non-centrally cleared SFTs. In the absence of clearing, such operations raise major risks if they are not properly collateralised. While enhancing transparency in the reuse of client assets would be a first step towards facilitating counterparties’ capacity to analyse and prevent risks, the FSB is due to complete its work, by 2016, on a set of recommendations on haircuts on non-centrally cleared SFTs to prevent excessive leveraging and mitigate concentration risk and default risk.

On 19 March 2012, the Commission published a Green Paper on Shadow Banking. Based on the extensive feedback received and taking into account international developments, the Commission issued, on 4 September 2013, a communication to the Council and the European Parliament entitled ‘Shadow Banking — Addressing New Sources of Risk in the Financial sector’. The Communication stressed that the complex and opaque nature of SFTs makes it difficult to identify counterparties and monitor risk concentration and also leads to the build-up of excessive leverage in the financial system.

A high-level expert group chaired by Erkki Liikanen adopted a report on reforming the structure of the Union banking sector in October 2012. It considered, among other things, the interaction between the traditional and the shadow banking systems. The report recognised the risks of shadow banking activities such as high leverage and pro-cyclicality, and it called for a reduction of the interconnectedness between banks and the shadow banking system, which had been a source of contagion in a system-wide banking crisis. The report also suggested certain structural measures to deal with remaining weaknesses in the Union banking sector.

Structural reforms of the Union banking system are dealt with in a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions. However, imposing structural measures on banks could result in certain activities being shifted to less-regulated areas such as the shadow banking sector. That proposal should therefore be accompanied by the binding transparency and reporting requirements for SFTs laid down in this Regulation. Thus, the transparency rules laid down in this Regulation complement that proposal.

This Regulation responds to the need to enhance the transparency of securities financing markets and thus of the financial system. In order to ensure equivalent conditions of competition and international convergence, this Regulation follows the FSB Policy Framework. It creates a Union framework under which details of SFTs can be efficiently reported to trade repositories and information on SFTs and total return swaps is disclosed to investors in collective investment undertakings. The definition of SFT in this Regulation does not include derivative contracts as defined in OTC of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 6 ) . However, it includes transactions that are commonly referred to as liquidity swaps and collateral swaps, which do not fall under the definition of derivative contracts in OTC. The need for international convergence is reinforced by the probability that, following structural reform of the Union banking sector, activities that are currently exercised by traditional banks might migrate to the shadow banking sector and encompass financial and non-financial entities. Therefore, even less transparency may arise for regulators and supervisors in respect of those activities, preventing them from obtaining a proper overview of the risks linked to SFTs. This would only aggravate already well established links between the regulated and the shadow banking sectors in particular markets.

The evolution of market practices and technological developments enable market participants to use transactions other than SFTs as a source of funding, for liquidity and collateral management, as a yield-enhancement strategy, to cover short sales or for dividend tax arbitrage. Such transactions could have an equivalent economic effect and pose risks similar to SFTs, including pro-cyclicality brought about by fluctuating asset values and volatility; maturity or liquidity transformation stemming from financing long-term or illiquid assets through short-term or liquid assets; and financial contagion arising from interconnectedness of chains of transactions involving collateral reuse.

In order to respond to the issues raised by the FSB Policy Framework and the developments envisaged following structural reform of the Union banking sector, Member States are likely to adopt divergent national measures which could create obstacles to the smooth functioning of the internal market and be to the detriment of market participants and financial stability. In addition, the lack of harmonised transparency rules makes it difficult for national authorities to compare the micro-level data stemming from different Member States and thus to understand the real risks individual market participants pose to the system. It is therefore necessary to prevent such distortions and obstacles from arising in the Union. Consequently, the appropriate legal basis for this Regulation is Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ( TFEU ), as interpreted in accordance with the consistent case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The new rules on transparency should therefore provide for the reporting of details regarding SFTs concluded by all market participants, whether they are financial or non-financial entities, including the composition of the collateral, whether the collateral is available for reuse or has been reused, the substitution of collateral at the end of the day and the haircuts applied. In order to minimise additional operational costs for market participants, the new rules and standards should build on pre-existing infrastructures, operational processes and formats which have been introduced with regard to reporting derivative contracts to trade repositories. In that context, the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (‘ESMA’) established by ESAESMAR of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 7 ) should, to the extent feasible and relevant, minimise overlaps and avoid inconsistencies between the technical standards adopted pursuant to this Regulation and those adopted pursuant to Article 9 of OTC. The legal framework laid down by this Regulation should, to the extent possible, be the same as that of OTC in respect of the reporting of derivative contracts to trade repositories registered for that purpose. This should also enable trade repositories registered or recognised in accordance with that Regulation to fulfil the repository function assigned by this Regulation, if they comply with certain additional criteria, subject to completion of a simplified registration process.

In order to ensure consistency and effectiveness of ESMA’s powers to impose penalties, the market participants that fall within the scope of this Regulation should, by reference to OTC, be subject to the provisions regarding ESMA’s powers as laid down in that Regulation as specified, in respect of the rules of procedure, by the delegated acts adopted pursuant to Article 64(7) of that Regulation.

Transactions with members of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) should be exempted from the obligation to report SFTs to trade repositories. However, in order to ensure that regulators and supervisors obtain a proper overview of the risks linked to SFTs concluded by the entities they regulate or supervise, the relevant authorities and the members of the ESCB should cooperate closely. Such cooperation should enable regulators and supervisors to fulfil their respective responsibilities and mandates. Such cooperation should be confidential, and conditional on a justified request from the relevant competent authorities, and should only be provided with a view to enabling those authorities to fulfil their respective responsibilities having due regard to the principles and requirements of the independence of central banks and the performance by them of their functions as monetary authorities, including the performance of monetary, foreign exchange and financial stability policy operations which members of the ESCB are legally empowered to pursue. The members of the ESCB should be able to refuse to provide information where the transactions are entered into by them in the performance of their functions as monetary authorities. They should notify the requesting authority of any such refusal together with the justification therefor.

Information on the risks inherent in securities financing markets should be centrally stored, and easily and directly accessible by, inter alia, ESMA, the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (‘EBA’) established by ESAEBAR of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 8 ) , the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) (‘EIOPA’) established by Regulation 2010/1094 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 9 ) , the relevant competent authorities, the ESRB and the relevant central banks of the ESCB, including the European Central Bank (ECB) in carrying out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism under Council Regulation 2013/1024 ( 10 ) , for the purpose of identification and monitoring of financial stability risks entailed by shadow banking activities of regulated and non-regulated entities. ESMA should take into consideration the technical standards adopted pursuant to Article 81 of OTC regulating trade repositories for derivative contracts and the future development of those technical standards when drawing up or proposing to revise the regulatory technical standards provided for in this Regulation. ESMA should also aim to ensure that the relevant competent authorities, the ESRB and the relevant central banks of the ESCB, including the ECB, have direct and immediate access to the information necessary to perform their duties, including to define and implement monetary policy and to perform oversight of financial market infrastructures. In order to ensure this, ESMA should set out the terms and conditions for access to such information in draft regulatory technical standards.

It is necessary to introduce provisions on the exchange of information between competent authorities and to strengthen the duties of assistance and cooperation which they owe each other. Due to increasing cross-border activity, competent authorities should provide each other with the relevant information for the exercise of their functions in order to ensure the effective enforcement of this Regulation, including in situations where infringements or suspected infringements may be of concern to authorities in two or more Member States. In the exchange of information, strict professional secrecy is needed to ensure the smooth transmission of that information and the protection of particular rights. Without prejudice to national criminal or tax law, the competent authorities, ESMA, bodies or natural or legal persons other than the competent authorities, which receive confidential information, should use it only in the performance of their duties and for the exercise of their functions. However, this should not prevent the exercise, in accordance with national law, of the functions of national bodies responsible for the prevention, investigation or correction of cases of maladministration.

SFTs are used extensively by managers of collective investment undertakings for efficient portfolio management. Such use can have a significant impact on the performance of those collective investment undertakings. SFTs can be used either to fulfil investment objectives or to enhance returns. Managers also make use of total return swaps which have effects equivalent to SFTs. SFTs and total return swaps are extensively used by managers of collective investment undertakings to get exposure to certain strategies or to enhance their returns. The use of SFTs and total return swaps could increase the general risk profile of the collective investment undertaking whereas their use is not properly disclosed to investors. It is crucial to ensure that investors in such collective investment undertakings are able to make informed choices and to assess the overall risk and reward profile of collective investment undertakings. When assessing SFTs and total return swaps, the collective investment undertaking should consider the substance of the transaction in addition to its legal form.

Investments made on the basis of incomplete or inaccurate information as regards a collective investment undertaking’s investment strategy can result in significant investor losses. It is therefore essential that collective investment undertakings disclose all relevant detailed information linked to their use of SFTs and total return swaps. In addition, full transparency is especially relevant in the area of collective investment undertakings as the entirety of assets that are subject to SFTs and total return swaps are not owned by the managers of collective investment undertakings but by their investors. Full disclosure as regards SFTs and total return swaps is therefore an essential tool to safeguard against possible conflicts of interest.

The new rules on transparency of SFTs and total return swaps are closely linked to Directives 2009/65/EC ( 11 ) and 2011/61/EU ( 12 ) of the European Parliament and of the Council since those Directives form the legal framework governing the establishment, management and marketing of collective investment undertakings.

Collective investment undertakings may operate as undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) managed by UCITS management companies or by UCITS investment companies authorised under UCITS or as alternative investment funds (AIFs) managed by alternative investment fund managers (AIFMs) authorised or registered under AIFMD. The new rules on transparency of SFTs and total return swaps introduced by this Regulation supplement, and should apply in addition to, the provisions of those Directives.

In order to enable investors to become aware of the risks associated with the use of SFTs and total return swaps, managers of collective investment undertakings should include detailed information on any recourse they have to those techniques in periodical reports. The existing periodical reports that UCITS management companies or UCITS investment companies and AIFMs have to produce should be supplemented by the additional information on the use of SFTs and total return swaps. In further specifying the content of those periodical reports, ESMA should take into account the administrative burden and the specificities of different types of SFTs and total return swaps.

A collective investment undertaking’s investment policy with respect to SFTs and total return swaps should be clearly disclosed in the pre-contractual documents, such as the prospectus for UCITS and the pre-contractual disclosure to investors for AIFs. This should ensure that investors understand and appreciate the inherent risks before they decide to invest in a particular UCITS or AIF.

Reuse of collateral provides liquidity and enables counterparties to reduce funding costs. However, it tends to create complex collateral chains between traditional banking and shadow banking, giving rise to financial stability risks. The lack of transparency on the extent to which financial instruments provided as collateral have been reused and the respective risks in the case of bankruptcy can undermine confidence in counterparties and magnify risks to financial stability.

In order to increase transparency of reuse, minimum information requirements should be imposed. Reuse should take place only with the express knowledge and consent of the providing counterparty. The exercise of a right to reuse should therefore be reflected in the securities account of the providing counterparty unless that account is governed by the law of a third country which provides for other appropriate means to reflect the reuse.

Although the scope of the rules concerning reuse in this Regulation is wider than that of FCAD of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 13 ) , this Regulation does not amend the scope of that Directive but should, rather, be read in addition to that Directive. The conditions subject to which counterparties have a right to reuse and to exercise that right should not in any way diminish the protection afforded to a title transfer financial collateral arrangement under FCAD. Against that background, any infringement of the transparency requirements of reuse should not affect national law concerning the validity or effect of a transaction.

This Regulation establishes strict information rules for counterparties on reuse which should not prejudice the application of sectorial rules adapted to specific actors, structures and situations. Therefore, the rules on reuse provided for in this Regulation should apply, for example, to collective investment undertakings and depositories or clients of investment firms only insofar as no more stringent rules on reuse are provided for in the legal framework for collective investment undertakings or for safeguarding of client assets constituting a lex specialis and taking precedence over the rules contained in this Regulation. In particular, this Regulation should be without prejudice to any rule under Union law or national law restricting the ability of counterparties to engage in reuse of financial instruments that are provided as collateral by counterparties or persons other than counterparties. The application of the reuse requirements should be deferred to six months after the date of entry into force of this Regulation in order to provide counterparties with sufficient time to adapt their outstanding collateral arrangements, including master agreements, and to ensure that new collateral arrangements comply with this Regulation.

In order to promote international consistency of terminology, the use of the term ‘reuse’ in this Regulation is in line with the FSB Policy Framework. This should not, however, lead to inconsistency within the Union acquis and, in particular, should be without prejudice to the meaning of the term ‘reuse’ employed in Directives 2009/65/EC and 2011/61/EU.

In order to ensure compliance by counterparties with the obligations deriving from this Regulation and that they are subject to similar treatment across the Union, Member States should ensure that competent authorities have the power to impose administrative sanctions and other administrative measures which are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Therefore, administrative sanctions and other administrative measures laid down in this Regulation should satisfy certain essential requirements in relation to addressees, criteria to be taken into account when applying a sanction or measure, publication of sanctions or measures, key powers to impose sanctions and levels of administrative pecuniary sanctions. It is appropriate that sanctions and other measures established under Directives 2009/65/EC and 2011/61/EU apply to infringements of the transparency obligations relating to the collective investment undertakings under this Regulation.

The powers to impose sanctions conferred on competent authorities should be without prejudice to the exclusive competence of the ECB, pursuant to Article 4(1) (a) of Regulation 2013/1024, to withdraw authorisations of credit institutions for prudential supervisory purposes.

Provisions in this Regulation regarding the application for registration of trade repositories and the withdrawal of registration do not affect the remedies provided for in Chapter V of ESAESMAR.

Technical standards in the financial services sector should ensure consistent harmonisation and adequate protection of depositors, investors and consumers across the Union. As a body with highly specialised expertise, it is efficient and appropriate to entrust ESMA with the development of draft regulatory technical and implementing standards which do not involve policy choices. ESMA should ensure efficient administrative and reporting processes when drafting technical standards. The Commission should be empowered to adopt regulatory technical standards by means of delegated acts pursuant to Article 290 TFEU and in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of ESAESMAR in the following areas: the details to be reported for different types of SFTs; the details of the application for registration or extension of the registration of a trade repository; the details of the procedures to be applied by trade repositories in order to verify the details of SFTs reported to them; the frequency and the details of publication of, the requirements for, and the access to, trade repositories’ data; and, if necessary, the further specification of the content of the Annex.

The Commission should be empowered to adopt implementing technical standards developed by ESMA by means of implementing acts pursuant to Article 291 TFEU and in accordance with Article 15 of ESAESMAR with regard to the format and frequency of the reports, the format of the application for registration or extension of the registration of a trade repository, as well as the procedures and forms for exchange of information on sanctions and other measures with ESMA.

The power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of amending the list of entities that are excluded from the scope of this Regulation and of the type of fees, the matters for which fees are due, the amount of the fees and the manner in which they are to be paid by trade repositories. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level. The Commission, when preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure a simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and to the Council.

In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to take decisions on the assessment of the rules of third countries for the purposes of recognising third-country trade repositories, and in order to avoid potentially duplicate or conflicting requirements. The assessment which forms the basis of decisions on equivalence of reporting requirements in a third country should not prejudice the right of a trade repository established in that third country and recognised by ESMA to provide reporting services to entities established in the Union, as a recognition decision should be independent of such an assessment for the purposes of an equivalence decision.

Where an implementing act on equivalence is withdrawn, counterparties should automatically be subject again to all of the requirements laid down in this Regulation.

Where appropriate, the Commission should cooperate with third-country authorities in order to explore mutually supportive solutions to ensure consistency between this Regulation and the requirements established by those third countries and thus avoid any possible duplication in this respect.

Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely enhancing the transparency of certain activities in financial markets such as the use of SFTs and reuse of collateral in order to enable the monitoring and identification of the corresponding risks, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather, by reason of the scale and effects of this Regulation, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.

This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, in particular the right to the protection of personal data, the right to respect for private and family life, the rights of the defence and the principle of ne bis in idem , the freedom to conduct a business, the right to property, the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. This Regulation must be applied according to those rights and principles.

The European Data Protection Supervisor was consulted in accordance with Article 28(2) of Regulation 2001/45 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 14 ) and delivered an opinion on 11 July 2014 ( 15 ) .

Any exchange or transmission of personal data by competent authorities of the Member States or by trade repositories should be undertaken in accordance with the rules on the transfer of personal data as laid down in Directive 1995/46 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 16 ) . Any exchange or transmission of personal data by ESMA, EBA or EIOPA should be carried out in accordance with the rules on the transfer of personal data as laid down in Regulation 2001/45.

With the assistance of ESMA, the Commission should monitor and prepare reports to the European Parliament and to the Council on the international application of the reporting obligation laid down in this Regulation. The time provided for submission of the Commission reports should allow for the prior effective application of this Regulation.

Following the outcome of the work carried out by relevant international fora, and with the assistance of ESMA, EBA and the ESRB, the Commission should submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on progress in international efforts to mitigate the risks associated with SFTs, including the FSB recommendations for haircuts on non-centrally cleared SFTs, and on the appropriateness of those recommendations for Union markets.

The application of the transparency requirements laid down in this Regulation should be deferred in order to provide trade repositories with sufficient time to apply for the authorisation and recognition of their activities provided for in this Regulation, and counterparties and collective investment undertakings with sufficient time to comply with those requirements. In particular, it is appropriate to defer the application of additional transparency requirements for collective investment undertakings, taking into account the Guidelines for competent authorities and UCITS management companies issued by ESMA on 18 December 2012 which lay down an optional framework for UCITS management companies regarding disclosure obligations and the need to reduce the administrative burden of managers of collective investment undertakings. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the reporting of SFTs, a phase-in of the application of the requirements by type of counterparty is necessary. Such an approach should take into account the effective ability of the counterparty to comply with the reporting obligations laid down in this Regulation.

The new uniform rules on the transparency of SFTs and certain over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, namely total return swaps, laid down in this Regulation are closely linked to the rules laid down in OTC, as those OTC derivatives fall within the scope of the reporting requirements laid down in that Regulation. In order to ensure a coherent scope of both sets of transparency and reporting requirements, a clear delineation between OTC derivatives and exchange-traded derivatives is needed irrespective of whether those contracts are traded in the Union or in third-country markets. The definition of OTC derivatives in OTC should therefore be amended in order to ensure that the same type of derivatives contracts are identified as either OTC derivatives or exchange-traded derivatives irrespective of whether those contracts are traded in the Union or in third-country markets.

OTC should therefore be amended accordingly,