LeX-Ray

The internal market in electricity, which has been progressively implemented throughout the Community since 1999, aims to deliver real choice for all consumers of the European Union, be they citizens or businesses, new business opportunities and more cross-border trade, so as to achieve efficiency gains, competitive prices, and higher standards of service, and to contribute to security of supply and sustainability.

CRIMIED of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity ( 4 ) has made a significant contribution towards the creation of such an internal market in electricity.

The freedoms which the Treaty guarantees the citizens of the Union — inter alia, the free movement of goods, the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services — are achievable only in a fully open market, which enables all consumers freely to choose their suppliers and all suppliers freely to deliver to their customers.

However, at present, there are obstacles to the sale of electricity on equal terms and without discrimination or disadvantages in the Community. In particular, non-discriminatory network access and an equally effective level of regulatory supervision in each Member State do not yet exist.

A secure supply of electricity is of vital importance for the development of European society, the implementation of a sustainable climate change policy, and the fostering of competitiveness within the internal market. To that end, cross-border interconnections should be further developed in order to secure the supply of all energy sources at the most competitive prices to consumers and industry within the Community.

A well-functioning internal market in electricity should provide producers with the appropriate incentives for investing in new power generation, including in electricity from renewable energy sources, paying special attention to the most isolated countries and regions in the Community’s energy market. A well-functioning market should also provide consumers with adequate measures to promote the more efficient use of energy for which a secure supply of energy is a precondition.

The Communication of the Commission of 10 January 2007 entitled ‘An Energy Policy for Europe’ highlighted the importance of completing the internal market in electricity and of creating a level playing field for all electricity undertakings established in the Community. The Communications of the Commission of 10 January 2007 entitled ‘Prospects for the internal gas and electricity market’ and ‘Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 2003/1 into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report)’ showed that the present rules and measures do not provide the necessary framework for achieving the objective of a well-functioning internal market.

In order to secure competition and the supply of electricity at the most competitive price, Member States and national regulatory authorities should facilitate cross-border access for new suppliers of electricity from different energy sources as well as for new providers of power generation.

Without effective separation of networks from activities of generation and supply (effective unbundling), there is an inherent risk of discrimination not only in the operation of the network but also in the incentives for vertically integrated undertakings to invest adequately in their networks.

The rules on legal and functional unbundling as provided for in CRIMIED have not, however, led to effective unbundling of the transmission system operators. At its meeting on 8 and 9 March 2007, the European Council therefore invited the Commission to develop legislative proposals for the ‘effective separation of supply and generation activities from network operations’.

Only the removal of the incentive for vertically integrated undertakings to discriminate against competitors as regards network access and investment can ensure effective unbundling. Ownership unbundling, which implies the appointment of the network owner as the system operator and its independence from any supply and production interests, is clearly an effective and stable way to solve the inherent conflict of interests and to ensure security of supply. For that reason, the European Parliament, in its resolution of 10 July 2007 on prospects for the internal gas and electricity market ( 5 ) referred to ownership unbundling at transmission level as the most effective tool by which to promote investments in infrastructure in a non-discriminatory way, fair access to the network for new entrants and transparency in the market. Under ownership unbundling, Member States should therefore be required to ensure that the same person or persons are not entitled to exercise control over a generation or supply undertaking and, at the same time, exercise control or any right over a transmission system operator or transmission system. Conversely, control over a transmission system or transmission system operator should preclude the possibility of exercising control or any right over a generation or supply undertaking. Within those limits, a generation or supply undertaking should be able to have a minority shareholding in a transmission system operator or transmission system.

Any system for unbundling should be effective in removing any conflict of interests between producers, suppliers and transmission system operators, in order to create incentives for the necessary investments and guarantee the access of new market entrants under a transparent and efficient regulatory regime and should not create an overly onerous regulatory regime for national regulatory authorities.

The definition of the term ‘control’ is taken from Council EMR of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) ( 6 ) .

Since ownership unbundling requires, in some instances, the restructuring of undertakings, Member States that decide to implement ownership unbundling should be granted additional time to apply the relevant provisions. In view of the vertical links between the electricity and gas sectors, the unbundling provisions should apply across the two sectors.

Under ownership unbundling, to ensure full independence of network operation from supply and generation interests and to prevent exchanges of any confidential information, the same person should not be a member of the managing boards of both a transmission system operator or a transmission system and an undertaking performing any of the functions of generation or supply. For the same reason, the same person should not be entitled to appoint members of the managing boards of a transmission system operator or a transmission system and to exercise control or any right over a generation or supply undertaking.

The setting up of a system operator or a transmission operator that is independent from supply and generation interests should enable a vertically integrated undertaking to maintain its ownership of network assets whilst ensuring effective separation of interests, provided that such independent system operator or such independent transmission operator performs all the functions of a system operator and detailed regulation and extensive regulatory control mechanisms are put in place.

Where, on 3 September 2009, an undertaking owning a transmission system is part of a vertically integrated undertaking, Member States should therefore be given a choice between ownership unbundling and setting up a system operator or transmission operator which is independent from supply and generation interests.

To preserve fully the interests of the shareholders of vertically integrated undertakings, Member States should have the choice of implementing ownership unbundling either by direct divestiture or by splitting the shares of the integrated undertaking into shares of the network undertaking and shares of the remaining supply and generation undertaking, provided that the requirements resulting from ownership unbundling are complied with.

The full effectiveness of the independent system operator or independent transmission operator solutions should be ensured by way of specific additional rules. The rules on the independent transmission operator provide an appropriate regulatory framework to guarantee fair competition, sufficient investment, access for new market entrants and the integration of electricity markets. Effective unbundling through the independent transmission operator provisions should be based on a pillar of organisational measures and measures relating to the governance of transmission system operators and on a pillar of measures relating to investment, connecting new production capacities to the network and market integration through regional cooperation. The independence of the transmission operator should also, inter alia, be ensured through certain ‘cooling-off’ periods during which no management or other relevant activity giving access to the same information as could have been obtained in a managerial position is exercised in the vertically integrated undertaking. The independent transmission operator model of effective unbundling is in line with the requirements laid down by the European Council at its meeting on 8 and 9 March 2007.

In order to develop competition in the internal market in electricity, large non-household customers should be able to choose their suppliers and enter into contracts with several suppliers to secure their electricity requirements. Such customers should be protected against exclusivity clauses the effect of which is to exclude competing or complementary offers.

A Member State has the right to opt for full ownership unbundling in its territory. Where a Member State has exercised that right, an undertaking does not have the right to set up an independent system operator or an independent transmission operator. Furthermore, an undertaking performing any of the functions of generation or supply cannot directly or indirectly exercise control or any right over a transmission system operator from a Member State that has opted for full ownership unbundling.

Under this Directive different types of market organisation will exist in the internal market in electricity. The measures that Member States could take in order to ensure a level playing field should be based on overriding requirements of general interest. The Commission should be consulted on the compatibility of the measures with the Treaty and Community law.

The implementation of effective unbundling should respect the principle of non-discrimination between the public and private sectors. To that end, the same person should not be able to exercise control or any right, in violation of the rules of ownership unbundling or the independent system operator option, solely or jointly, over the composition, voting or decision of the bodies of both the transmission system operators or the transmission systems and the generation or supply undertakings. With regard to ownership unbundling and the independent system operator solution, provided that the Member State in question is able to demonstrate that the requirement is complied with, two separate public bodies should be able to control generation and supply activities on the one hand and transmission activities on the other.

Fully effective separation of network activities from supply and generation activities should apply throughout the Community to both Community and non-Community undertakings. To ensure that network activities and supply and generation activities throughout the Community remain independent from each other, regulatory authorities should be empowered to refuse certification to transmission system operators that do not comply with the unbundling rules. To ensure the consistent application of those rules across the Community, the regulatory authorities should take utmost account of the Commission’s opinion when the former take decisions on certification. To ensure, in addition, respect for the international obligations of the Community, and solidarity and energy security within the Community, the Commission should have the right to give an opinion on certification in relation to a transmission system owner or a transmission system operator which is controlled by a person or persons from a third country or third countries.

The security of energy supply is an essential element of public security and is therefore inherently connected to the efficient functioning of the internal market in electricity and the integration of the isolated electricity markets of Member States. Electricity can reach the citizens of the Union only through the network. Functioning electricity markets and, in particular, the networks and other assets associated with electricity supply are essential for public security, for the competitiveness of the economy and for the well-being of the citizens of the Union. Persons from third countries should therefore be allowed to control a transmission system or a transmission system operator only if they comply with the requirements of effective separation that apply inside the Community. Without prejudice to the international obligations of the Community, the Community considers that the electricity transmission system sector is of high importance to the Community and therefore additional safeguards are necessary regarding the preservation of the security of supply of energy to the Community to avoid any threats to public order and public security in the Community and the welfare of the citizens of the Union. The security of supply of energy to the Community requires, in particular, an assessment of the independence of network operation, the level of the Community’s and individual Member States’ dependence on energy supply from third countries, and the treatment of both domestic and foreign trade and investment in energy in a particular third country. Security of supply should therefore be assessed in the light of the factual circumstances of each case as well as the rights and obligations arising under international law, in particular the international agreements between the Community and the third country concerned. Where appropriate the Commission is encouraged to submit recommendations to negotiate relevant agreements with third countries addressing the security of supply of energy to the Community or to include the necessary issues in other negotiations with those third countries.

Non-discriminatory access to the distribution network determines downstream access to customers at retail level. The scope for discrimination as regards third-party access and investment, however, is less significant at distribution level than at transmission level where congestion and the influence of generation or supply interests are generally greater than at distribution level. Moreover, legal and functional unbundling of distribution system operators was required, pursuant to CRIMIED, only from 1 July 2007 and its effects on the internal market in electricity still need to be evaluated. The rules on legal and functional unbundling currently in place can lead to effective unbundling provided they are more clearly defined, properly implemented and closely monitored. To create a level playing field at retail level, the activities of distribution system operators should therefore be monitored so that they are prevented from taking advantage of their vertical integration as regards their competitive position on the market, in particular in relation to household and small non-household customers.

Member States should encourage the modernisation of distribution networks, such as through the introduction of smart grids, which should be built in a way that encourages decentralised generation and energy efficiency.

In the case of small systems it may be necessary that the provision of ancillary services is ensured by transmission system operators interconnected with small systems.

To avoid imposing a disproportionate financial and administrative burden on small distribution system operators, Member States should be able, where necessary, to exempt the undertakings concerned from the legal distribution unbundling requirements.

Where a closed distribution system is used to ensure the optimal efficiency of an integrated energy supply requiring specific operational standards, or a closed distribution system is maintained primarily for the use of the owner of the system, it should be possible to exempt the distribution system operator from obligations which would constitute an unnecessary administrative burden because of the particular nature of the relationship between the distribution system operator and the users of the system. Industrial, commercial or shared services sites such as train station buildings, airports, hospitals, large camping sites with integrated facilities or chemical industry sites can include closed distribution systems because of the specialised nature of their operations.

Authorisation procedures should not lead to an administrative burden disproportionate to the size and potential impact of electricity producers. Unduly lengthy authorisation procedures may constitute a barrier to access for new market entrants.

Further measures should be taken in order to ensure transparent and non-discriminatory tariffs for access to networks. Those tariffs should be applicable to all system users on a non-discriminatory basis.

CRIMIED introduced a requirement for Member States to establish regulators with specific competences. However, experience shows that the effectiveness of regulation is frequently hampered through a lack of independence of regulators from government, and insufficient powers and discretion. For that reason, at its meeting on 8 and 9 March 2007, the European Council invited the Commission to develop legislative proposals providing for further harmonisation of the powers and strengthening of the independence of national energy regulators. It should be possible for those national regulatory authorities to cover both the electricity and the gas sectors.

Energy regulators need to be able to take decisions in relation to all relevant regulatory issues if the internal market in electricity is to function properly, and to be fully independent from any other public or private interests. This precludes neither judicial review nor parliamentary supervision in accordance with the constitutional laws of the Member States. In addition, approval of the budget of the regulator by the national legislator does not constitute an obstacle to budgetary autonomy. The provisions relating to the autonomy in the implementation of the allocated budget of the regulatory authority should be implemented in the framework defined by national budgetary law and rules. While contributing to the independence of the national regulatory authority from any political or economic interest through an appropriate rotation scheme, it should be possible for Member States to take due account of the availability of human resources and of the size of the board.

In order to ensure effective market access for all market players, including new entrants, non-discriminatory and cost-reflective balancing mechanisms are necessary. As soon as the electricity market is sufficiently liquid, this should be achieved through the setting up of transparent market-based mechanisms for the supply and purchase of electricity, needed in the framework of balancing requirements. In the absence of such a liquid market, national regulatory authorities should play an active role to ensure that balancing tariffs are non-discriminatory and cost-reflective. At the same time, appropriate incentives should be provided to balance the in-put and off-take of electricity and not to endanger the system. Transmission system operators should facilitate participation of final customers and final customers’ aggregators in reserve and balancing markets.

National regulatory authorities should be able to fix or approve tariffs, or the methodologies underlying the calculation of the tariffs, on the basis of a proposal by the transmission system operator or distribution system operator(s), or on the basis of a proposal agreed between those operator(s) and the users of the network. In carrying out those tasks, national regulatory authorities should ensure that transmission and distribution tariffs are non-discriminatory and cost-reflective, and should take account of the long-term, marginal, avoided network costs from distributed generation and demand-side management measures.

Energy regulators should have the power to issue binding decisions in relation to electricity undertakings and to impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties on electricity undertakings which fail to comply with their obligations or to propose that a competent court impose such penalties on them. Energy regulators should also be granted the power to decide, irrespective of the application of competition rules, on appropriate measures ensuring customer benefits through the promotion of effective competition necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market in electricity. The establishment of virtual power plants — electricity release programmes whereby electricity undertakings are obliged to sell or to make available a certain volume of electricity or to grant access to part of their generation capacity to interested suppliers for a certain period of time — is one of the possible measures that can be used to promote effective competition and ensure the proper functioning of the market. Energy regulators should also be granted the power to contribute to ensuring high standards of universal and public service in compliance with market opening, to the protection of vulnerable customers, and to the full effectiveness of consumer protection measures. Those provisions should be without prejudice to both the Commission’s powers concerning the application of competition rules including the examination of mergers with a Community dimension, and the rules on the internal market such as the free movement of capital. The independent body to which a party affected by the decision of a national regulator has a right to appeal could be a court or other tribunal empowered to conduct a judicial review.

Any harmonisation of the powers of national regulatory authorities should include the powers to provide incentives to electricity undertakings, and to impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties on electricity undertakings or to propose that a competent court impose such penalties. Moreover, regulatory authorities should have the power to request relevant information from electricity undertakings, make appropriate and sufficient investigations and settle disputes.

The internal market in electricity suffers from a lack of liquidity and transparency hindering the efficient allocation of resources, risk hedging and new entry. There is a need for enhancement of competition and security of supply through facilitated integration of new power plants into the electricity network in all Member States, in particular encouraging new market entrants. Trust in the market, its liquidity and the number of market participants needs to increase, and, therefore, regulatory oversight of undertakings active in the supply of electricity needs to be increased. Such requirements should be without prejudice to, and compatible with, existing Community law in relation to the financial markets. Energy regulators and financial market regulators need to cooperate in order to enable each other to have an overview over the markets concerned.

Prior to the adoption by the Commission of Guidelines defining further the record-keeping requirements, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators established by EACERR of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators ( 7 ) (the ‘Agency’), and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (the ‘CESR’), established by Commission Decision 2009/77/EC ( 8 ) , should confer and advise the Commission in regard to their content. The Agency and the CESR should also cooperate to investigate further and advise on whether transactions in electricity supply contracts and electricity derivatives should be subject to pre- or post-trade transparency requirements and, if so, what the content of those requirements should be.

Member States or, where a Member State has so provided, the regulatory authority, should encourage the development of interruptible supply contracts.

All Community industry and commerce, including small and medium-sized enterprises, and all citizens of the Union that enjoy the economic benefits of the internal market should also be able to enjoy high levels of consumer protection, and in particular household customers and, where Member States deem it appropriate, small enterprises should also be able to enjoy public service guarantees, in particular with regard to security of supply and reasonable tariffs, for reasons of fairness, competitiveness and, indirectly, to create employment. Those customers should also have access to choice, fairness, representation and dispute settlement mechanisms.

Nearly all Member States have chosen to ensure competition in the electricity generation market through a transparent authorisation procedure. However, Member States should ensure the possibility to contribute to security of supply through the launching of a tendering procedure or an equivalent procedure in the event that sufficient electricity generation capacity is not built on the basis of the authorisation procedure. Member States should have the possibility, in the interests of environmental protection and the promotion of new infant technologies, of tendering for new capacity on the basis of published criteria. Such new capacity includes, inter alia, electricity from renewable energy sources and combined heat and power.

In the interests of security of supply, the balance between supply and demand in individual Member States should be monitored, and such monitoring should be followed by a report on the situation at Community level, taking account of interconnection capacity between areas. Such monitoring should be carried out sufficiently early to enable appropriate measures to be taken if security of supply is compromised. The construction and maintenance of the necessary network infrastructure, including interconnection capacity, should contribute to ensuring a stable electricity supply. The maintenance and construction of the necessary network infrastructure, including interconnection capacity and decentralised electricity generation, are important elements in ensuring a stable electricity supply.

Member States should ensure that household customers and, where Member States deem it appropriate, small enterprises, enjoy the right to be supplied with electricity of a specified quality at clearly comparable, transparent and reasonable prices. In order to ensure the maintenance of the high standards of public service in the Community, all measures taken by Member States to achieve the objective of this Directive should be regularly notified to the Commission. The Commission should regularly publish a report analysing measures taken at national level to achieve public service objectives and comparing their effectiveness, with a view to making recommendations as regards measures to be taken at national level to achieve high public service standards. Member States should take the necessary measures to protect vulnerable customers in the context of the internal market in electricity. Such measures may differ according to the particular circumstances in the Member States in question and may include specific measures relating to the payment of electricity bills, or more general measures taken in the social security system. Where universal service is also provided to small enterprises, measures to ensure that such universal service is provided may differ according to whether they are aimed at household customers or small enterprises.

Respect for the public service requirements is a fundamental requirement of this Directive, and it is important that common minimum standards, respected by all Member States, are specified in this Directive, which take into account the objectives of consumer protection, security of supply, environmental protection and equivalent levels of competition in all Member States. It is important that the public service requirements can be interpreted on a national basis, taking into account national circumstances and subject to the respect of Community law.

It should be possible for Member States to appoint a supplier of last resort. That supplier may be the sales division of a vertically integrated undertaking, which also performs the functions of distribution, provided that it meets the unbundling requirements of this Directive.

It should be possible for measures implemented by Member States to achieve the objectives of social and economic cohesion to include, in particular, the provision of adequate economic incentives, using, where appropriate, all existing national and Community tools. Such tools may include liability mechanisms to guarantee the necessary investment.

To the extent to which measures taken by Member States to fulfil public service obligations constitute State aid under Article 87(1) of the Treaty, there is an obligation under Article 88(3) of the Treaty to notify them to the Commission.

The public service requirements, including as regards the universal service, and the common minimum standards that follow from them need to be further strengthened to make sure that all consumers, especially vulnerable ones, are able to benefit from competition and fair prices. The public service requirements should be defined at national level, taking into account national circumstances; Community law should, however, be respected by the Member States. The citizens of the Union and, where Member States deem it appropriate, small enterprises, should be able to enjoy public service obligations, in particular with regard to security of supply, and reasonable prices. A key aspect of supplying customers is access to objective and transparent consumption data. Thus, consumers should have access to their consumption data and associated prices and services costs so that they can invite competitors to make an offer based on those data. Consumers should also have the right to be properly informed about their energy consumption. Prepayments should reflect the likely consumption of electricity and different payment systems should be non-discriminatory. Information on energy costs provided to consumers frequently enough will create incentives for energy savings because it will give customers direct feedback on the effects of investment in energy efficiency and change of behaviour. In this respect, full implementation of EEUEESD of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on energy end-use efficiency and energy services ( 9 ) will help consumers to reduce their energy costs.

Consumer interests should be at the heart of this Directive and quality of service should be a central responsibility of electricity undertakings. Existing rights of consumers need to be strengthened and guaranteed, and should include greater transparency. Consumer protection should ensure that all consumers in the wider remit of the Community benefit from a competitive market. Consumer rights should be enforced by Member States or, where a Member State has so provided, the regulatory authorities.

Clear and comprehensible information should be made available to consumers concerning their rights in relation to the energy sector. The Commission should establish, after consulting relevant stakeholders including Member States, national regulatory authorities, consumer organisations and electricity undertakings, an accessible, user-friendly energy consumer checklist providing consumers with practical information about their rights. That checklist should be provided to all consumers and should be made publicly available.

Energy poverty is a growing problem in the Community. Member States which are affected and which have not yet done so should therefore develop national action plans or other appropriate frameworks to tackle energy poverty, aiming at decreasing the number of people suffering such situation. In any event, Member States should ensure the necessary energy supply for vulnerable customers. In doing so, an integrated approach, such as in the framework of social policy, could be used and measures could include social policies or energy efficiency improvements for housing. At the very least, this Directive should allow national policies in favour of vulnerable customers.

Greater consumer protection is guaranteed by the availability of effective means of dispute settlement for all consumers. Member States should introduce speedy and effective complaint handling procedures.

It should be possible to base the introduction of intelligent metering systems on an economic assessment. Should that assessment conclude that the introduction of such metering systems is economically reasonable and cost-effective only for consumers with a certain amount of electricity consumption, Member States should be able to take this into account when implementing intelligent metering systems.

Market prices should give the right incentives for the development of the network and for investing in new electricity generation.

Promoting fair competition and easy access for different suppliers and fostering capacity for new electricity generation should be of the utmost importance for Member States in order to allow consumers to take full advantage of the opportunities of a liberalised internal market in electricity.

With a view to creating an internal market in electricity, Member States should foster the integration of their national markets and the cooperation of system operators at Community and regional level, also incorporating isolated systems forming electricity islands that persist in the Community.

The development of a true internal market in electricity, through a network connected across the Community, should be one of the main goals of this Directive and regulatory issues on cross-border interconnections and regional markets should, therefore, be one of the main tasks of the regulatory authorities, in close cooperation with the Agency where relevant.

Securing common rules for a true internal market and a broad supply of electricity accessible to all should also be one of the main goals of this Directive. To that end, undistorted market prices would provide an incentive for cross-border interconnections and for investments in new power generation while leading, in the long term, to price convergence.

Regulatory authorities should also provide information on the market to permit the Commission to exercise its role of observing and monitoring the internal market in electricity and its short, medium and long-term evolution, including aspects such as generation capacity, different sources of electricity generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure, quality of service, cross-border trade, congestion management, investments, wholesale and consumer prices, market liquidity and environmental and efficiency improvements. National regulatory authorities should report to the competition authorities and the Commission those Member States in which prices impair competition and proper functioning of the market.

Since the objective of this Directive, namely the creation of a fully operational internal electricity market, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

Under Regulation 2009/714 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity ( 10 ) , the Commission may adopt Guidelines to achieve the necessary degree of harmonisation. Such Guidelines, which constitute binding implementing measures, are, also with regard to certain provisions of this Directive, a useful tool which can be adapted quickly where necessary.

The measures necessary for the implementation of this Directive should be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission ( 11 ) .

In particular, the Commission should be empowered to adopt the Guidelines necessary for providing the minimum degree of harmonisation required to achieve the aim of this Directive. Since those measures are of general scope and are designed to amend non-essential elements of this Directive, by supplementing it with new non-essential elements, they must be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny provided for in Article 5 a of Decision 1999/468/EC.

In accordance with point 34 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making ( 12 ) , Member States are encouraged to draw up, for themselves and in the interest of the Community, their own tables, illustrating, as far as possible, the correlation between this Directive and the transposition measures, and to make them public.

Given the scope of the amendments made to CRIMIED herein, it is desirable, for reasons of clarity and rationalisation, that the provisions in question should be recast by bringing them all together in a single text in a new Directive.

This Directive respects the fundamental rights, and observes the principles, recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,