LeX-Ray

Securitisation involves transactions that enable a lender or a creditor – typically a credit institution or a corporation – to refinance a set of loans, exposures or receivables, such as residential loans, auto loans or leases, consumer loans, credit cards or trade receivables, by transforming them into tradable securities. The lender pools and repackages a portfolio of its loans, and organises them into different risk categories for different investors, thus giving investors access to investments in loans and other exposures to which they normally would not have direct access. Returns to investors are generated from the cash flows of the underlying loans.

In its communication of 26 November 2014 on an Investment Plan for Europe, the Commission announced its intention to restart high-quality securitisation markets, without repeating the mistakes made before the 2008 financial crisis. The development of a simple, transparent and standardised securitisation market constitutes a building block of the Capital Markets Union (CMU) and contributes to the Commission’s priority objective of supporting job creation and a return to sustainable growth.

The Union aims to strengthen the legislative framework implemented after the financial crisis to address the risks inherent in highly complex, opaque and risky securitisation. It is essential to ensure that rules are adopted to better differentiate simple, transparent and standardised products from complex, opaque and risky instruments and to apply a more risk-sensitive prudential framework.

Securitisation is an important element of well-functioning financial markets. Soundly structured securitisation is an important channel for diversifying funding sources and allocating risk more widely within the Union financial system. It allows for a broader distribution of financial-sector risk and can help free up originators’ balance sheets to allow for further lending to the economy. Overall, it can improve efficiencies in the financial system and provide additional investment opportunities. Securitisation can create a bridge between credit institutions and capital markets with an indirect benefit for businesses and citizens (through, for example, less expensive loans and business financing, and credits for immovable property and credit cards). Nevertheless, this Regulation recognises the risks of increased interconnectedness and of excessive leverage that securitisation raises, and enhances the microprudential supervision by competent authorities of a financial institution’s participation in the securitisation market, as well as the macroprudential oversight of that market by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), established by Regulation 2010/1092 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 4 ) , and by the national competent and designated authorities for macroprudential instruments.

Establishing a more risk-sensitive prudential framework for simple, transparent and standardised (‘STS’) securitisations requires that the Union clearly define what an STS securitisation is, since otherwise the more risk-sensitive regulatory treatment for credit institutions and insurance companies would be available for different types of securitisations in different Member States. This would lead to an unlevel playing field and to regulatory arbitrage, whereas it is important to ensure that the Union functions as a single market for STS securitisations and that it facilitates cross-border transactions.

In line with the existing definitions in Union sectoral legislation, it is appropriate to provide definitions of all the key concepts of securitisation. In particular, a clear and encompassing definition of securitisation is needed to capture any transaction or scheme whereby the credit risk associated with an exposure or pool of exposures is tranched. An exposure that creates a direct payment obligation for a transaction or scheme used to finance or operate physical assets should not be considered an exposure to a securitisation, even if the transaction or scheme has payment obligations of different seniority.

A sponsor should be able to delegate tasks to a servicer, but should remain responsible for risk management. In particular, a sponsor should not transfer the risk-retention requirement to his servicer. The servicer should be a regulated asset manager such as an undertaking for the collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) management company, an alternative investment fund manager (AIFM) or an entity referred to in MIFID2 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 5 ) (MiFID entity).

This Regulation introduces a ban on resecuritisation, subject to derogations for certain cases of resecuritisations that are used for legitimate purposes and to clarifications as to whether asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) programmes are considered to be resecuritisations. Resecuritisations could hinder the level of transparency that this Regulation seeks to establish. Nevertheless, resecuritisations can, in exceptional circumstances, be useful in preserving the interests of investors. Therefore, resecuritisations should only be permitted in specific instances as established by this Regulation. In addition, it is important for the financing of the real economy that fully supported ABCP programmes that do not introduce any re-tranching on top of the transactions funded by the programme remain outside the scope of the ban on resecuritisation.

Investments in or exposures to securitisations not only expose the investor to credit risks of the underlying loans or exposures, but the structuring process of securitisations could also lead to other risks such as agency risk, model risk, legal and operational risk, counterparty risk, servicing risk, liquidity risk and concentration risk. Therefore, it is essential that institutional investors be subject to proportionate due-diligence requirements ensuring that they properly assess the risks arising from all types of securitisations, to the benefit of end investors. Due diligence can thus also enhance confidence in the market and between individual originators, sponsors and investors. It is necessary that investors also exercise appropriate due diligence with regard to STS securitisations. They can inform themselves with the information disclosed by the securitising parties, in particular the STS notification and the related information disclosed in this context, which should provide investors with all the relevant information on the way STS criteria are met. Institutional investors should be able to place appropriate reliance on the STS notification and the information disclosed by the originator, sponsor and securitisation special purpose entity (SSPE) on whether a securitisation meets the STS requirements. However, they should not rely solely and mechanistically on such a notification and such information.

It is essential that the interests of originators, sponsors, original lenders that are involved in a securitisation and investors be aligned. To achieve this, the originator, sponsor or original lender should retain a significant interest in the underlying exposures of the securitisation. It is therefore important for the originator, sponsor or original lender to retain a material net economic exposure to the underlying risks in question. More generally, securitisation transactions should not be structured in such a way so as to avoid the application of the retention requirement. That requirement should be applicable in all situations where the economic substance of a securitisation is applicable, whatever legal structures or instruments are used. There is no need for multiple applications of the retention requirement. For any given securitisation, it suffices that only the originator, the sponsor or the original lender is subject to the requirement. Similarly, where securitisation transactions contain other securitisations positions as underlying exposures, the retention requirement should be applied only to the securitisation which is subject to the investment. The STS notification should indicate to investors that the originator, sponsor or original lender is retaining a material net economic exposure to the underlying risks. Certain exceptions should be made for cases in which securitised exposures are fully, unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed in particular by public authorities. Where support from public resources is provided in the form of guarantees or by other means, this Regulation is without prejudice to State aid rules.

Originators or sponsors should not take advantage of the fact that they could hold more information than investors and potential investors on the assets transferred to the SSPE, and should not transfer to the SSPE, without the knowledge of the investors or potential investors, assets whose credit-risk profile is higher than that of comparable assets held on the balance sheet of the originators. Any breach of that obligation should be subject to sanctions to be imposed by competent authorities, though only when such a breach is intentional. Negligence alone should not be subject to sanctions in that regard. However, that obligation should not prejudice in any way the right of originators or sponsors to select assets to be transferred to the SSPE that ex ante have a higher-than-average credit-risk profile compared to the average credit-risk profile of comparable assets that remain on the balance sheet of the originator, as long as the higher credit-risk profile of the assets transferred to the SSPE is clearly communicated to the investors or potential investors. Competent authorities should supervise compliance with this obligation by comparing the assets underlying a securitisation and comparable assets held on the originator’s balance sheet. The comparison of performance should be made between assets that are ex ante expected to have similar performances, for example between non-performing residential mortgages transferred to the SSPE and non-performing residential mortgages held on the balance sheet of the originator. There is no presumption that the assets underlying a securitisation should perform similarly to the average assets held on the originator’s balance sheet.

The ability of investors and potential investors to exercise due diligence and thus make an informed assessment of the creditworthiness of a given securitisation instrument depends on their access to information on those instruments. Based on the existing acquis , it is important to create a comprehensive system under which investors and potential investors will have access to all the relevant information over the entire life of the transactions, to reduce originators’, sponsors’ and SSPEs’ reporting tasks and to facilitate investors’ continuous, easy and free access to reliable information on securitisations. To enhance market transparency, a framework for securitisation repositories to collect relevant reports, primarily on underlying exposures in securitisations, should be established. Such securitisation repositories should be authorised and supervised by the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (‘ESMA’), established by ESAESMAR of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 6 ) . In specifying the details of such reporting tasks, ESMA should ensure that the information required to be reported to such repositories reflects as closely as possible existing templates for disclosures of such information.

The main purpose of the general obligation for the originator, sponsor and the SSPE to make available information on securitisations via the securitisation repository is to provide the investors with a single and supervised source of the data necessary for performing their due diligence. Private securitisations are often bespoke. They are important because they allow parties to enter into securitisation transactions without disclosing sensitive commercial information on the transaction (e.g. disclosing that a certain company needs funding to expand production or that an investment firm is entering a new market as part of its strategy) and/or related to the underlying assets (e.g. on the type of trade receivable generated by an industrial firm) to the market and competitors. In those cases, investors are in direct contact with the originator and/or sponsor and receive the information necessary to perform their due diligence directly from them. Therefore, it is appropriate to exempt private securitisations from the requirement to notify the transaction information to a securitisation repository.

Originators, sponsors and original lenders should apply to exposures to be securitised the same sound and well-defined criteria for credit-granting which they apply to non-securitised exposures. However, to the extent that trade receivables are not originated in the form of a loan, credit-granting criteria need not be met with respect to trade receivables.

Securitisation instruments are generally not appropriate for retail clients within the meaning of MIFID2.

Originators, sponsors and SSPEs should make available in the investor report all materially relevant data on the credit quality and performance of underlying exposures, including data allowing investors to clearly identify delinquency and default of underlying debtors, debt restructuring, debt forgiveness, forbearance, repurchases, payment holidays, losses, charge offs, recoveries and other asset performance remedies in the pool of underlying exposures. The investor report should include in the case of a securitisation which is not an ABCP transaction data on the cash flows generated by underlying exposures and by the liabilities of the securitisation, including separate disclosure of the securitisation position’s income and disbursements, namely scheduled principal, scheduled interest, prepaid principal, past due interest and fees and charges, and data relating to the triggering of any event implying changes in the priority of payments or replacement of any counterparties, as well as data on the amount and form of credit enhancement available to each tranche. Although securitisations that are simple, transparent and standardised have in the past performed well, the satisfaction of any STS requirements does not mean that the securitisation position is free of risks, nor does it indicate anything about the credit quality underlying the securitisation. Instead, it should be understood to indicate that a prudent and diligent investor will be able to analyse the risks involved in the securitisation. In order to allow for the different structural features of long-term securitisations and of short-term securitisations (namely ABCP programmes and ABCP transactions), there should be two types of STS requirements: one for long-term securitisations and one for short-term securitisations corresponding to those two differently functioning market segments. ABCP programmes rely on a number of ABCP transactions consisting of short-term exposures which need to be replaced once matured. In an ABCP transaction, securitisation could be achieved, inter alia, through agreement on a variable purchase-price discount on the pool of underlying exposures, or the issuance of senior and junior notes by an SSPE in a co-funding structure where the senior notes are then transferred to the purchasing entities of one or more ABCP programmes. However, ABCP transactions qualifying as STS should not include any resecuritisations. In addition, STS criteria should reflect the specific role of the sponsor providing liquidity support to the ABCP programme, in particular for fully supported ABCP programmes.

At both the international and Union level, much work has already been done to identify STS securitisation. In Commission Delegated Regulations II ( 7 ) and (EU) 2015/61 ( 8 ) , criteria have already been set out for STS securitisation for specific purposes to which a more risk-sensitive prudential treatment is given.

SSPEs should only be established in third countries that are not listed as high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). If a specific Union list of third-country jurisdictions that refuse to comply with tax good-governance standards has been adopted by the time a review of this Regulation is conducted, that Union list should be taken into account and could become the reference list for third countries where SSPEs are not allowed to be established.

It is essential to establish a general and cross-sectorally applicable definition of STS securitisation based on the existing criteria, as well as on the criteria adopted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) on 23 July 2015 for identifying simple, transparent and comparable securitisations in the framework of capital sufficiency for securitisations, and in particular based on the opinion on a European framework for qualifying securitisation published on 7 July 2015 by the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (EBA), established by ESAEBAR of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 9 ) .

Implementation of the STS criteria throughout the Union should not lead to divergent approaches. Divergent approaches would create potential barriers for cross-border investors by obliging them to familiarise themselves with the details of the Member State frameworks, thereby undermining investor confidence in the STS criteria. The EBA should therefore develop guidelines to ensure a common and consistent understanding of the STS requirements throughout the Union, in order to address potential interpretation issues. Such a single source of interpretation would facilitate the adoption of the STS criteria by originators, sponsors and investors. ESMA should also play an active role in addressing potential interpretation issues.

In order to prevent divergent approaches in the implementation of the STS criteria, the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) should, in the framework of the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities, coordinate their work and that of the competent authorities to ensure cross-sectoral consistency and assess practical issues which could arise with regard to STS securitisations. In doing so, the views of market participants should also be requested and taken into account to the extent possible. The outcome of those discussions should be made public on the websites of the ESAs so as to help originators, sponsors, SSPEs and investors assess STS securitisations before issuing or investing in such positions. Such a coordination mechanism would be particularly important in the period leading up to the implementation of this Regulation.

This Regulation only allows for ‘true-sale’ securitisations to be designated as STS. In a true-sale securitisation, the ownership of the underlying exposures is transferred or effectively assigned to an issuer entity which is a SSPE. The transfer or assignment of the underlying exposures to the SSPE should not be subject to clawback provisions in the event of the seller’s insolvency, without prejudice to provisions of national insolvency laws under which the sale of underlying exposures concluded within a certain period before the declaration of the seller’s insolvency can, under strict conditions, be invalidated.

A legal opinion provided by a qualified legal counsel could confirm the true sale or assignment or transfer with the same legal effect of the underlying exposures and the enforceability of that true sale, assignment or transfer with the same legal effect under the applicable law.

In securitisations which are not true-sale, the underlying exposures are not transferred to an issuer entity which is a SSPE, but rather the credit risk related to the underlying exposures is transferred by means of a derivative contract or guarantees. This introduces an additional counterparty credit risk and potential complexity related in particular to the content of the derivative contract. For those reasons, the STS criteria should not allow synthetic securitisation. The progress made by the EBA in its report of December 2015, identifying a possible set of STS criteria for synthetic securitisation and defining ‘balance-sheet synthetic securitisation’ and ‘arbitrage synthetic securitisation’, should be acknowledged. Once the EBA has clearly determined a set of STS criteria specifically applicable to balance-sheet synthetic securitisations, and with a view to promoting the financing of the real economy and in particular of SMEs, which benefit the most from such securitisations, the Commission should draft a report and, if appropriate, adopt a legislative proposal in order to extend the STS framework to such securitisations. However, no such extension should be proposed by the Commission in respect of arbitrage synthetic securitisations.

The underlying exposures transferred from the seller to the SSPE should meet predetermined and clearly defined eligibility criteria which do not allow for active portfolio management of those exposures on a discretionary basis. Substitution of exposures that are in breach of representations and warranties should in principle not be considered active portfolio management.

Underlying exposures should not include exposures in default or exposures to obligors or guarantors that, to the best of the originator’s or original lender’s knowledge, are in specified situations of credit-impairedness (for example, obligors that have been declared insolvent). The ‘best knowledge’ standard should be considered to be fulfilled on the basis of information obtained from debtors on origination of the exposures, information obtained from the originator in the course of its servicing of the exposures or in the course of its risk-management procedure or information notified to the originator by a third party. A prudent approach should apply to exposures which have been non-performing and have subsequently been restructured. However, the inclusion of the latter in the pool of underlying exposure should not be excluded where such exposures have not presented new arrears since the date of the restructuring, which should have taken place at least one year prior to the date of transfer or assignment of the underlying exposures to the SSPE. In such cases, adequate disclosure should ensure full transparency.

To ensure that investors perform robust due diligence and to facilitate the assessment of underlying risks, it is important that securitisation transactions are backed by pools of exposures that are homogenous in asset type, such as pools of residential loans, or pools of corporate loans, business property loans, leases and credit facilities to undertakings of the same category, or pools of auto loans and leases, or pools of credit facilities to individuals for personal, family or household consumption purposes. The underlying exposures should not include transferable securities, as defined in point (44) of Article 4(1) of MIFID2. To cater for those Member States where it is common practice for credit institutions to use bonds instead of loan agreements to provide credit to non-financial corporations, it should be possible to include such bonds, provided that they are not listed on a trading venue.

It is essential to prevent the recurrence of ‘originate to distribute’ models. In those situations lenders grant credits applying poor and weak underwriting policies as they know in advance that related risks are eventually sold to third parties. Thus, the exposures to be securitised should be originated in the ordinary course of the originator’s or original lender’s business pursuant to underwriting standards that should not be less stringent than those the originator or original lender applies at the time of origination to similar exposures which are not securitised. Material changes in underwriting standards should be fully disclosed to potential investors or, in the case of fully supported ABCP programmes, to the sponsor and other parties directly exposed to the ABCP transaction. The originator or original lender should have sufficient experience in originating exposures of a similar nature to those which have been securitised. In the case of securitisations where the underlying exposures are residential loans, the pool of loans should not include any loan that was marketed and underwritten on the premise that the loan applicant or, where applicable intermediaries, were made aware that the information provided might not be verified by the lender. The assessment of the borrower’s creditworthiness should also meet where applicable, the requirements set out in CACD ( 10 ) or 2014/17/EU ( 11 ) of the European Parliament and of the Council or equivalent requirements in third countries.

A strong reliance of the repayment of securitisation positions on the sale of assets securing the underlying assets creates vulnerabilities, as illustrated by the poor performance of parts of the market for commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) during the financial crisis. Therefore, CMBS should not be considered to be STS securitisations.

Where data on the environmental impact of assets underlying securitisations are available, the originator and sponsor of such securitisations should publish them. Therefore, the originator, the sponsor and the SSPE of an STS securitisation where the underlying exposures are residential loans or auto loans or leases should publish the available information related to the environmental performance of the assets financed by such residential loans or auto loans or leases.

Where originators, sponsors and SSPEs would like their securitisations to use the STS designation, investors, competent authorities and ESMA should be notified that the securitisation meets the STS requirements. The notification should include an explanation on how each of the STS criteria has been complied with. ESMA should then publish it on a list of notified STS securitisations made available on its website for information purposes. The inclusion of a securitisation issuance in ESMA’s list of notified STS securitisations does not imply that ESMA or other competent authorities have certified that the securitisation meets the STS requirements. Compliance with the STS requirements remains solely the responsibility of the originators, sponsors and SSPEs. This should ensure that originators, sponsors and SSPEs take responsibility for their claim that the securitisation is STS and that there is transparency on the market.

Where a securitisation no longer meets the STS requirements, the originator and sponsor should immediately notify ESMA and the relevant competent authority. Moreover, where a competent authority has imposed administrative sanctions with regard to a securitisation notified as being STS, that competent authority should immediately notify ESMA for their inclusion on the STS notifications list allowing investors to be informed about such sanctions and about the reliability of STS notifications. It is therefore in the interest of originators and sponsors to make well-considered notifications in order to avoid reputational consequences.

Investors should perform their own due diligence on investments commensurate with the risks involved but they should be able to rely on the STS notification and on the information disclosed by the originator, sponsor and SSPE on whether a securitisation meets the STS requirements. However, they should not rely solely and mechanistically on such notifications and information.

The involvement of third parties in helping to check compliance of a securitisation with the STS requirements could be useful for investors, originators, sponsors and SSPEs and contribute to increasing confidence in the market for STS securitisations. Originators, sponsors and SSPEs could also use the services of a third party authorised in accordance with this Regulation to assess whether their securitisation complies with the STS criteria. Those third parties should be subject to authorisation by competent authorities. The notification to ESMA and the subsequent publication on ESMA’s website should mention whether STS compliance was confirmed by an authorised third party. However, it is essential that investors make their own assessment, take responsibility for their investment decisions and do not mechanistically rely on such third parties. The involvement of a third party should not in any way shift away from originators, sponsors and institutional investors the ultimate legal responsibility for notifying and treating a securitisation transaction as STS.

Member States should designate competent authorities and provide them with the necessary supervisory, investigative and sanctioning powers. Administrative sanctions should, in principle, be published. Since investors, originators, sponsors, original lenders and SSPEs can be established in different Member States and supervised by different sectoral competent authorities, close cooperation between relevant competent authorities, including the European Central Bank (ECB) with regard to specific tasks conferred on it by Council Regulation 2013/1024 ( 12 ) , and with the ESAs should be ensured by the mutual exchange of information and assistance in supervisory activities. Competent authorities should apply sanctions only in the case of intentional or negligent infringements. The application of remedial measures should not depend on evidence of intention or negligence. In determining the appropriate type and level of sanction or remedial measure, when taking into account the financial strength of the responsible natural or legal person, competent authorities should in particular take into consideration the total turnover of the responsible legal person or the annual income and net assets of the responsible natural person.

Competent authorities should closely coordinate their supervision and ensure consistent decisions, especially in the event of infringements of this Regulation. Where such an infringement concerns an incorrect or misleading notification, the competent authority identifying that infringement should also inform the ESAs and the relevant competent authorities of the Member States concerned. In the event of disagreement between the competent authorities, ESMA, and, where appropriate, the Joint-Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities, should exercise their binding mediation powers.

The requirements for using the designation ‘simple, transparent and standardised’ (STS) securitisation are new and will be further specified by EBA guidelines and supervisory practice over time. In order to avoid discouraging market participants from using that designation, competent authorities should have the ability to grant the originator, sponsor and SSPE a grace period of three months to rectify any erroneous use of the designation that they have used in good faith. Good faith should be presumed where the originator, sponsor and SSPE could not know that a securitisation did not meet all the STS criteria to be designated as STS. During that grace period, the securitisation in question should continue to be considered STS-compliant and should not be deleted from the list drawn up by ESMA in accordance with this Regulation.

This Regulation promotes the harmonisation of a number of key elements in the securitisation market without prejudice to further complementary market-led harmonisation of processes and practices in securitisation markets. For that reason, it is essential that market participants and their professional associations continue working on further standardising market practices, and in particular the standardisation of documentation of securitisations. The Commission should carefully monitor and report on the standardisation efforts made by market participants.

Directives 2009/65/EC ( 13 ) , 2009/138/EC ( 14 ) and 2011/61/EU ( 15 ) of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulations CRAR ( 16 ) and (EU) No 648/2012 ( 17 ) of the European Parliament and of the Council are amended accordingly to ensure consistency of the Union legal framework with this Regulation on provisions related to securitisation the main object of which is the establishment and functioning of the internal market, in particular by ensuring a level playing field in the internal market for all institutional investors.

As regards the amendments to OTC, over-the-counter (‘OTC’) derivative contracts entered into by SSPEs should not be subject to the clearing obligation provided that certain conditions are met. This is because counterparties to OTC derivative contracts entered into with SSPEs are secured creditors under the securitisation arrangements and adequate protection against counterparty credit risk is usually provided for. With respect to non-centrally cleared derivatives, the levels of collateral required should also take into account the specific structure of securitisation arrangements and the protections already provided for therein.

There is a degree of substitutability between covered bonds and securitisations. Therefore, in order to prevent the possibility of distortion or arbitrage between the use of securitisations and covered bonds because of the different treatment of OTC derivative contracts entered into by covered bond entities or by SSPEs, OTC should be amended to ensure consistency of treatment between derivatives associated with covered bonds and derivatives associated with securitisations, with regard to the clearing obligation and to the margin requirements on non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives.

In order to harmonise the supervisory fees that are to be charged by ESMA, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ( TFEU ) should be delegated to the Commission in respect of further specifying the type of fees, the matters for which fees are due, the amount of the fees and the manner in which they are to be paid. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement of 13 April 2016 on Better Law-Making ( 18 ) . In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States’ experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts.

In order to specify the risk-retention requirement, as well as to further clarify the homogeneity criteria and the exposures to be deemed homogenous under the requirements on simplicity, while ensuring that the securitisation of SME loans is not negatively affected, the Commission should be empowered to adopt regulatory technical standards developed by the EBA with regard to the modalities for retaining risk, the measurement of the level of retention, certain prohibitions concerning the retained risk, the retention on a consolidated basis and the exemption for certain transactions, and the specification of homogeneity criteria and of which underlying exposures are deemed to be homogeneous. The Commission should adopt those regulatory technical standards by means of delegated acts pursuant to Article 290 TFEU and in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of ESAEBAR. The EBA should consult closely with the other two ESAs.

In order to facilitate investors continuous, easy and free access to reliable information on securitisations, as well as to specify the terms of the cooperation and exchange of information obligation of competent authorities, the Commission should be empowered to adopt regulatory technical standards developed by ESMA with regard to: comparable information on underlying exposures and regular investor reports; the list of legitimate purposes under which resecuritisations are permitted; the procedures enabling securitisation repositories to verify the completeness and consistency of the details reported, the application for registration and simplified application for an extension of registration; the details of the securitisation to be provided for transparency reasons, the operational standards required for the collection, aggregation and comparison of data across securitisation repositories, the information to which designated entities have access and the terms and conditions for direct access; the information to be provided in the case of STS notification; the information to be provided to the competent authorities in the application for the authorisation of a third-party verifier; and the information to be exchanged and the content and scope of the notification obligations. The Commission should adopt those regulatory technical standards by means of delegated acts pursuant to Article 290 TFEU and in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of ESAESMAR. ESMA should consult closely with the other two ESAs.

In order to facilitate the process for investors, originators, sponsors and SSPEs, the Commission should also be empowered to adopt implementing technical standards developed by ESMA, with regard to: the templates to be used when making information available to holders of a securitisation position; the format of the application for registration and of the application for an extension of registration of securitisation repositories; template for the provision of information; the templates to be used to provide information to the securitisation repository, taking into account solutions developed by existing securitisation data collectors; and the template for STS notifications that will provide investors and competent authorities with sufficient information for their assessment of compliance with the STS requirements. The Commission should adopt those implementing technical standards by means of implementing acts pursuant to Article 291 TFEU and in accordance with Article 15 of ESAESMAR. ESMA should consult closely with the other two ESAs.

Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely laying down a general framework for securitisation and creating a specific framework for STS securitisation, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States given that securitisation markets operate globally and that a level playing field in the internal market for all institutional investors and entities involved in securitisation should be ensured but can rather, by reason of their scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives.

This Regulation should apply to securitisations the securities of which are issued on or after 1 January 2019.

For securitisation positions outstanding as of 1 January 2019, originators, sponsors and SSPEs should be able to use the designation ‘STS’ provided that the securitisation complies with the STS requirements, for certain requirements at the time of notification and for other requirements at the time of origination. Therefore, originators, sponsors and SSPEs should be able to submit an STS notification to ESMA pursuant to this Regulation. Any subsequent modification to the securitisation should be accepted provided that the securitisation continues to meet all of the applicable STS requirements.

The due-diligence requirements that are applied in accordance with existing Union law before the date of application of this Regulation should continue to apply to securitisations issued on or after 1 January 2011, and to securitisations issued before 1 January 2011 where new underlying exposures have been added or substituted after 31 December 2014. The relevant provisions of Commission Delegated Regulation 2014/625 ( 19 ) that specify the risk-retention requirements for credit institutions and investments firms within the meaning of PRCIIFR of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 20 ) should remain applicable until the moment that the regulatory technical standards on risk retention pursuant to this Regulation apply. For reasons of legal certainty, credit institutions or investment firms, insurance undertakings, reinsurance undertakings and alternative investment fund managers should, for securitisation positions outstanding as of the date of application of this Regulation, continue to be subject to Article 405 of PRCIIFR and to Chapters I, II and III and Article 22 of Delegated Regulation 2014/625, Articles 254 and 255 of Delegated II and Article 51 of Commission Delegated Regulation 2013/231 ( 21 ) respectively. In order to ensure that originators, sponsors and SSPEs comply with their transparency obligations, until the regulatory technical standards to be adopted by the Commission pursuant to this Regulation apply, the information referred to in Annexes I to VIII of Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/3 ( 22 ) should be made publicly available,